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ABSTRACT
With the reforms of the so-called ‘Jobs Act’ (JA), Italy aimed to
structurally reform its labour market and income-support system,
through recalibration (i.e. amix of both expansionary and retrenching
measures) for old social policy risks, and someexpansionarymeasures
to face new social risks. The JA also became the symbol of opposite
views about the Italian welfare state, being itself a reason for ideolo-
gical conﬂict and coalition reshuﬄing in the Italian left. Ultimately, its
increasing personalization around Renzi’s divisive ﬁgure detracted
from its functional and substantive matter. Hence, the JA reform
provides an unparalleled vantage point to investigate the role of
narrative stories in shaping policy contents and reforms. The paper
aims to contribute to the literature on social policy reforms by com-
bining a focus on narrative stories with the analytical perspective of
the Multiple Stream Framework. Through qualitative analysis of oﬃ-
cial documents, of more than 500 newspaper articles and of selected
in-depth interviews to key informants, this paper reconstructs the
narratives about the JA reform, considering both the supporters and
the challengers. Building on the Multiple Stream Framework, the
paper focuses in particular on whether and how policy entrepreneurs
took advantage of windows of opportunity by shaping the narrative
stories. Results are twofold. First, the paper shows the variations of
social policy reform narratives across actors. Second, it demonstrates
the crucial role of policy entrepreneurs in shaping narrative stories as
a strategy to couple the streams of problem, policy and politics.
KEYWORDS
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1. Introduction
When it comes to tackle welfare state reform, scholars often bring into play both
external and internal drivers of change (Ferrera & Hemerijck, 2003), also focusing on
the matching between problems, policies and politics (Natali, 2004). At the same time,
scant attention has been devoted to narrative stories in accounting for policy change, as
‘the policy of constructing policy reality’ is often underspeciﬁed (Shanahan, Jones,
McBeth, & Lane, 2013, p. 455), and especially so in social policy reforms.
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Yet, the construction of policy reality and, more speciﬁcally, the use of narrative
stories, show how political actors provide a rationale for the need for reform. Narrative
stories – understood as highly simpliﬁed stories about how (good or bad) things happen
(Stone, 2012, p. 158) – express how political actors justify policy change as a necessity.
Hence, narrative stories may help to study how social policy reforms are commu-
nicated and to shed a diﬀerent light on their political consequences in the long run.
Moreover, narrative stories may reveal how policy entrepreneurs act in the promotion
of policy change under conditions of ambiguity and time constraints, as theorized by
John Kingdon (1995) and scholars within the Multiple Stream Framework (MSF)
(Zahariadis, 2007; Zohlnhöfer & Rüb, 2016).
In this paper, we aim to contribute to the literature on social policy reforms by
combining a focus on narrative stories with the analytical perspective of the Multiple
Stream Framework. We address two research questions regarding Italy’s recent
(2014–2016) labour market reform, known as Jobs Act (JA). Consistently with the aims
of this special issue, the ﬁrst research question relates to the role that narrative stories play
in social policy reform processes. How did political actors construct the problems of the
Italian labour market through narrative stories? What was the content of the narratives of
both promoters and challengers of policy reforms? Our second research question refers to
the role of policy entrepreneurs and their strategies. We select our case accordingly, on the
basis of the existence in this particular instance – as contrasted with other instances of
labour market reform in Italy – of a clear policy entrepreneur, the Italian Prime Minister
Matteo Renzi with the utmost degree of ownership of the reform (Nannicini, Sacchi, &
Taddei, 2019). Thus our question becomes: Did Renzi as a policy entrepreneur shape
narratives as a strategy to ‘couple the streams’, and bring about his ‘pet solutions’ (Kingdon,
1995)? How? Did such narratives evolve with the unravelling of the reform process?
To answer these questions, we reconstruct narrative stories in one case of social policy
reform – the JA – in order to show how diﬀerent political actors express the necessity for
reform. Moreover, we use such evidence to understand if narratives have any role in making
reforms happen. Building onKindgon view about policy change as the coupling of the streams
of problems, policies and politicsmade by a policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995), we consider
narrative stories as part of the entrepreneurial strategies to achieve policy change when
a window of opportunity opens (Zahariadis, 2007). In fact, it is not always clear how narrative
stories and argumentations help to couple the problem with the policy solution (Blum 2018),
and, at the same time, to build political coalitions. The MSF identiﬁes ‘framing’ as one of the
entrepreneurial strategies for the entrepreneur to couple the streams, basically dealing with
problem representation that makes a diﬀerence in what people perceive to be losses or gains
(Zahariadis, 2007, p. 77). Framing is a way of making sense of a complex reality: in other
words, framing is the basis for the stories or narratives talked by the participants of a policy
process (Fischer & Forester, 1993, p. 11). Hence, narrative stories can be considered as the
result of strategic framing by purposeful policy entrepreneurs who try to emphasize the gains
and to minimize the losses of the reform, also pointing to the importance of symbols to rouse
emotions in order to aﬀect the national mood, aﬀect priming and, in so doing, couple the
streams (Zahariadis, 2007, 2016).
Against this backdrop, the JA oﬀers an interesting case to understand the role of
policy entrepreneurs in the MSF and of narrative stories in shaping the reform
process. The JA reform is acknowledged as a case of success in policy change
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(Pinelli, Torre, Pace, Cassio, & Arpaia, 2017; Vesan & Pavolini, 2018). At the same
time, it was a highly contested reform, ultimately leading to a rearrangement of the
centre-left political coalition, with at least two relevant party splits on the left of the
political spectrum.
The JA put forward a mix of both expansionary and retrenching measures for old
social policy risks, and some expansionary measures to face new social risks (Picot &
Tassinari, 2017; Sacchi, 2018). In fact, the JA reformed employment protection legislation
(EPL), introduced a recalibration both within passive policies and towards active labor
market policies (ALMP) and work-family balance schemes (Sacchi & Roh, 2016, p. 367).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next session, the theoretical priors of the MSF and
the role of narrative stories therein will be discussed, while case selection and methodology
will be justiﬁed. In section 3, the timing of the process, the problem pressure, the political
drivers and the policy content of the JA reform will be described, with particular attention
to the purposeful action of the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi (February 2014 –
December 2016) as a policy entrepreneur. section 4 analyses the narratives of supporters
and challengers of the reform. section 5 discusses how the ideas, the timing and the
strategies of the actors shape the narratives. The ﬁnal section concludes.
2. Conceptual framework and methods
Following the conceptual introduction to this special issue (Blum and Kuhlmann., 2019, p.
339–355), we will focus on the narrative stories as representation of policies created by social
actors. Building on the narrativist literature (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 457–458), two elements
are necessary to distinguish between narratives and non-narratives, thus allowing for empiri-
cal research: the presence of a policy stance or preference; and the presence of one or more
characters in the story. Additionally, other elements of narrative stories are a setting (showing
social or economic conditions), a moral (showing a policy solution), a plot (a story device
connecting all the elements of the narrative).
Focusing on the constitutive elements of the narrative stories in social policy reform, the
policy preference usually implies a deﬁnition of a problem and a statement about a policy
behavior (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 457), such as for example the assertion that young people
looking for jobs deserve a more ﬂexible employment legislation. The characters might be
a hero, a villain, a victim in Stone’s (2012) terms, or types of target populations such as the
advantaged, the contenders, the dependants, and the deviants (Blum and Kuhlmann, 2019).
Hence, diﬀerent types of social policy reform narratives may be present, according to the
type of social risk (old or new) and to the direction of the reform (expansionary or
retrenching). Building on the framework put forward by Blum and Kuhlmann, 2019 (p. 9),
we can expect: (a) stories of giving-to-give for expansionary old-social-risks policies particu-
larly pledging for the deservingness of the advantaged; (b) stories of giving-to shape for
expansionary new-social-risks policies especially pushing for the empowerment of the
dependants; (c) stories of taking-to-control for retrenching old-social-risks policies mainly
pointing to the responsibility of contenders and deviants or to the helplessness of advantaged;
and (d) stories of taking-out-of-helplessness for retrenching new-social-risks policies mostly
focusing on the deservingness of deviants and contenders and on the helplessness of
dependants.
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This framework is particularly useful to understand how policy change is commu-
nicated in the agenda and in the formulation stages, and to clarify the role of policy
entrepreneurs therein according to the MSF.
By considering both external and internal drivers for policy change, theMSF proposes that
policy change happens when the independent streams of problems, policies and politics are
coupled due to two contingent phenomena: the policy-window or window of opportunity,
and the policy entrepreneur (Kingdon, 1995) or the ‘political’ entrepreneur (Rüb, 2016, p. 56).
The policy-window is ‘an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet
solutions, or to push attention to their speciﬁc problems’ (Kingdon, 1995, p. 173).
A necessary condition for policy change, a policy-window is conceived as a process that
develops between an opening and a closing (Rüb, 2016, p. 62). In this sense, policy-
windows can be can be kept opened during a ‘momentum’, deﬁned as ‘a situation in
which a chance or possibility arises, which is brought about by institutional factors or
the political regimes or by external factors’ (Rüb, 2016, p. 59–60).
The policy entrepreneurs are ‘advocates who are willing to invest their resources – time,
energy, reputation and money – to promote a position in return for anticipated future gains’
(Kingdon, 1995, p. 188). Furthermore, policy entrepreneurs ‘perform the function of coupling
for the system’, and even if the presence of the entrepreneur cannot alone bring change to pass,
‘without the presence of an entrepreneur, the linking of the streams may not take place’
(Kingdon, 1995, p. 191). Though policy entrepreneurs are often thought of as external to
political institutions, MSF scholars such as Zahariadis have highlighted that also political
leaders may act as policy entrepreneurs, using strategic framing and aﬀective priming to
inﬂuence the national mood. Policy entrepreneurs are more likely to be successful at coupling
if they use framing strategies and symbols to present their pet policy solutions as a radical
change or ‘a large deviation from the status quo’, that is needed to face a problem perceived as
a great loss (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 78).
Although the causal role of policy entrepreneurs has not often been theorized nor
empirically analyzed in MSF (Jones et al., 2016), in what follows we aim at illuminating
such role in the context of a single case study of labour andwelfare reform.Wewill investigate
into the import of PrimeMinister Renzi acting as a policy entrepreneur for achieving change
by coupling the streams in the Italian JA.
2.1 Research design and single case selection
From a research design perspective, the JA reform can be seen as a ‘least likely’ crucial
case to conﬁrm the role of policy entrepreneurs in policy change (Gerring, 2007) and to
uncover the role of policy narratives in social policy reform.
As a matter of fact, the Italian labor market has experienced several attempts of reform,
aiming at reinvigorating job growth and reducing labour market segmentation, but most of
themwere quite limited in their scope. Those in the 1990s and 2000s introduced reforms ‘at
the margins’, expanding ﬁxed-term work while leaving open-ended employment
untouched, and failed both to reform income support so as to provide higher coverage
for the unemployed, and to introduce ALMP (Berton, Richiardi, & Sacchi, 2012). Over the
past decade, favourable conditions for the coupling of the streams have been present. As for
the problem stream, the problem of the dualism between insiders and outsiders in the
labour market deepened with the economic crisis (Sacchi & Vesan, 2015), and the demand
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for protection against new social risks constantly rose. As for the policy stream, alternative
policy solutions about the ﬂexibilization of the labour market were present. As for the
political stream, alternation in government oﬀered several opportunities for reform. At the
same time, focusing events such as the ﬁnancial crisis in the 2008 provided a window of
opportunity for reform, also building upon external pressures for change. Yet, all this did
not yield any substantial reform with the Berlusconi government (2008–2011) (Sacchi,
2013), while under the Monti government (2011–2012) a major reform was attempted, but
had then to be watered down in order to be passed (Picot & Tassinari, 2017; Sacchi, 2015).
On the contrary, during the Renzi government (2014–2016), the interplay between
domestic and external factors facilitated structural change (Sacchi, 2018; Sacchi & Roh,
2016; Vesan, 2017), and, as our analysis will show, Renzi acted as a policy entrepreneur,
by pushing the issue of labour market reform in the political agenda. At the same time,
the Prime Minister nurtured the political debate with narrative stories, shaping those
narratives according to external factors and his domestic agenda.
In Kingdon’s terms, the several previous attempts of labour market reforms in Italy would
be situations where many conditions for achieving policy change existed – and in particular
the opening of windows of opportunity to ripe the streams – but structural reforms did not
happen because of the lack of one key condition: the presence of successful policy entrepre-
neurs. In this particular sense, given a past record of policy failure in spite of favourable
conditions, the JA represent a ‘least-likely’ crucial case (Gerring, 2007, p. 116–119) to conﬁrm
the importance of policy entrepreneurs in making change happen, and to uncover the role of
narrative stories in promoting their pet policy solution, which Renzi also used to expand the
traditional constituency of his party (the centre-left Partito Democratico, PD) by trying to
build a new ‘bloc bourgeois’ (Picot & Tassinari, 2017; Vesan, 2017).
The paper will rely on a qualitative approach and on the triangulation of diﬀerent sources.
Parliamentary documents and hearings were used to identify all relevant supporters and
challengers of the JA. Journal articles quoting political actors’ declarations were qualitatively
analysed and coded to reconstruct the elements of the narrative stories. Using the free online
search engine of one of the main Italian newspapers, La Repubblica, we collected articles on
the JA between December 2013 andMarch 20181. The initial collection of the journal articles
was made by searching for a combination of keywords in the search engine of the journal,
conditional to the joint presence of all these lemmas: ‘Jobs act’, ‘surname of the political actor’,
‘acronym of the political party/organization/institution’. The result of the search was then
qualitatively analysed, in order to isolate the elements of the narrative stories (a policy
preference, a character, a setting, a moral, a plot). The selection of the articles for the
qualitative analysis was not made via automated software but by the researchers themselves,
in order to control for the presence of the diﬀerent elements of the narratives in the quotation
marks and to avoid mistakes in attributing the declarations to the political actors – since
many declarations of diﬀerent actors are reported in the same article. In this way, we selected
more than 500 journal articles, from which we extracted quotation marks to code the
elements of the narratives in more than 600 rows. Moreover, we triangulate these qualitative
data with 7 in-depth interviews – conducted betweenApril andOctober 2018 – to unions and
1Among the three main Italian national newspapers, Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica and La Stampa, la Repubblica
has the most extensive free-access web search engine. Moreover, and most importantly, we only analysed actors’
declarations, that is actual quotations of their utterances from direct interviews or news agencies, thereby limiting
potential bias.
POLICY AND SOCIETY 489
employers representatives, and to key policy advisors and policymakers involved in the
elaboration of the JA. The interviews are aimed at highlighting the agency of the policy
entrepreneurs and at understanding the motivations of actors and the role that ideas and
timing have played in shaping the narratives2.
3. The italian jobs act reform: problems, politics, policies, and timing
The reform of the Italian labour market takes its name after a blueprint for labour market
reform that the secretary of PD, Matteo Renzi, proposed as a symbol of its leadership of the
party – and later of his government (Sacchi & Roh, 2016). The Jobs Act blueprint was
drafted as a partisan document between December 2013 and March 2014. It was translated
into several legislative interventions between December 2014 and October 20163.
A chronology of the approval of the diﬀerent pieces of legislation and related political
events is oﬀered in Figure 1, which highlights the main windows of opportunity and of the
role of Renzi acting as a policy entrepreneur.
The JA can be considered as a structural reform of several constitutive aspects of the
Italian labour market (Picot & Tassinari, 2017; Sacchi, 2018; Vesan, 2016). The latter
traditionally presented two features exacerbated by the crisis: strong segmentation and
the prevalence of passive policy interventions through the use of short-time work
(STW, cassa integrazione) (Molina & Rhodes, 2007; Sacchi & Vesan, 2015)4.
Figure 1. A chronology of the Italian Jobs Act.
Source: authors' own elaboration.
2The authors would like to thank Tommaso Sacconi for invaluable research assistance, and Arianna Tassinari for sharing
the interviews conducted also for another project. A list of the interviewees is available from the authors upon
request.
3The JA reform included an initial bill, in the form of a delegating law, approved by Parliament in December 2014,
entrusting the government with the power to introduce implementing decrees. Eight implementing decrees were
introduced between March 2015 and September 2015, plus a ‘reform ﬁne-tuning’ decree in October 2016.
4Short-time work (from the German Kurzarbeit) is a scheme that replaces foregone wages of workers who are still
formally employed but work reduced hours in cases of company crisis or restructuring.
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After 2008, the Berlusconi government basically ‘froze’ the problem of unemploy-
ment, by an extensive use of STW and the introduction of other special forms of
income support, the ammortizzatori in deroga (extraordinary social shock absorbers)
(Sacchi, 2018, p. 32). In 2011, despite strong external pressures for reform when Italy
was hit by the sovereign debt crisis, thus opening a policy-window to introduce those
labour market reforms he had been trying to adopt since the early 2000s, Berlusconi
was unable to bring into eﬀect any policy change (Sacchi, 2015).
After 2012, labour policy entered the agenda for reform, with policy interventions
that combined liberalization of the labour market with expansion of social rights, a mix
that Picot and Tassinari (2017) deﬁne ‘embedding ﬂexibilization’. This was the result of
the interplay between domestic and external political drivers to change (Sacchi & Roh,
2016), such as the implicit conditionality that Italy had to abide by in order to get relief
on its sovereign debt crisis through the help of the European Central Bank (ECB)
(Sacchi, 2015, p. 77).
While the Monti government strongly acted on pensions already in 2011, a milder
intervention on the labour market was introduced in 2012 (Sacchi, 2015). It was the
result of a compromise to overcome the opposition of the leftist faction of PD (partner
in the government coalition at the time), the one closer to the largest Italian union, the
leftist Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL). The reform changed the
dismissal rules for open-ended workers, but still allowed for a pervasive role of labour
courts in deciding whether reinstatement could be applied in lieu of monetary com-
pensation in the event of unlawful dismissal. Admittedly, it was a watered-down reform
as contrasted with Monti’s expectations and initial draft, as recognized by Monti
himself who publicly advocated for its overhaul5. Moreover, another initial target of
the reform, STW, was left unchanged due to the opposition of both unions and
employers, and ALMP were absent.
In the March 2013 elections PD became the major party in the Parliament, but the
formation of a new coalition government reveled very diﬃcult. After a few months of
the Letta government, supported by a coalition comprised of PD, centrist and centre-
right parties, in December 2013 Matteo Renzi became the PD secretary, and presented
the JA blueprint as one of the reforms necessary to ‘restart the country’ (Matteo Renzi
e-news n. 381, 8 January 2014), raising attention on the issue. At the same time, the
problem of unemployment (increased to 13.7% in January 2014 from 8.5% in
January 2011, Eurostat data), especially youth unemployment (under 25, from 30.7%
in January 2011 to 46.8% in January 2014, Eurostat data), gained prominence in the
public debate6.
When Renzi replaced Letta as Prime Minister in February 2014, a window of
opportunity opened and the labour market reform entered at full steam into the
political agenda. PD’s stunning result in the elections for the European Parliament in
May 2014 (above 40% of votes) reinvigorated the Prime Minister’s action in promoting
the JA delegating law.
5In a speech given at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2013, Monti declared that on labour market
reform ‘we did not go far enough’ [because of the opposition of Cgil]. Monti: ‘Riforma del lavoro, ostacolati da Cgil’.
E la Ue mette l’Italia in mora sui diritti sindacali, Repubblica 24/1/2013.
6See La Repubblica, La politica di fronte ai dati Istat sulla disoccupazione. Camusso: Senza svolta andrà anche peggio, 8/1/
2014.
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In summer 2014, the JA reform came to be driven by both external and domestic
factors, thus extending the opening of the window of opportunity by providing
‘momentum’ (Rüb, 2016). On the external side, implicit conditionality was still at
play, with the urge for the Italian government to be seen as trustworthy by other EU
partners, so as to reduce the opposition towards the introduction of Quantitative Easing
within the ECB governing board (Sacchi & Roh, 2016). Moreover, Italy started its
semester of Presidency of the Council of the EU in July 2014, and the government was
determined to promote the introduction of more ﬂexibility within the Stability and
Growth Pact, also through the ‘structural reforms clause’, i.e. allowing for budgetary
ﬂexibility in exchange for structural reforms. Renzi thus inserted a new, divisive and
highly symbolic topic in the JA: the initial idea of a new work-insertion contract to ease
transitions into the labour market became a thorough reform of EPL for all newly
established open-ended contracts. This meant exempting such contracts from the
provision of the so-called Article 18 of the 1970 Workers Statute on job reinstatement
in cases of unfair dismissal (henceforth: Art. 18). All newly-established open-ended
contracts entail no reinstatement in the event of unfair dismissal (with the exception of
discriminatory dismissals), replaced by monetary compensation increasing with
seniority7. Discretion of labour courts is drastically curtailed.
At the same time, the enhancement of the JA reform was also due to domestic drivers.
With the JA, Renzi was trying to expand the constituency of the PD, catering to diverse
socioeconomic categories of voters in the attempt to create a ‘bloc bourgeois’ (Picot &
Tassinari, 2017; Vesan, 2017). To this aim, EPL reform could be valued by those outside
paid employment, as well as by younger socioeconomic professionals and labour market
outsiders, including those in non-standard employment who could see their employment
chances increased by reduced segmentation. The emphasis on ALMP also catered to the
latter groups, as well as the extension of unemployment beneﬁts (UB) to include (mostly
young) non-standard workers and raise beneﬁt duration up to 2 years irrespective of age
(Vesan, 2016). The expansion of social rights, mostly through new UB, also served the
purpose of making the EPL reform more palatable to the more leftist faction of the PD8.
Domestic politics also matters to the JA reform for another reason. The JA was
openly supported by the majority of PD and by the coalition center-right junior partner
NCD (Nuovo Centro Destra), emerged from a split in Berlusconi’s camp. Conﬁndustria
and the other employers’ associations were substantially in favour of the reform. Still,
the challengers were many: strong opposition came from CGIL and the more centrist
Unione Italiana del Lavoro (UIL), and, most notably, from the minority of PD and the
radical left party Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (SEL), both contrary to limiting the reach of
Art. 18. The JA was also opposed by the opposition parties M5S and Lega Nord (LN),
and increasingly by Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI), particularly after the break-up of
a deal between Renzi and Berlusconi to reform the Constitution9. Opposition to the JA
7Art. 18 is still applicable to open-ended contracts established before entry into force of the reform, in March 2015.
8See for instance the interview to an eminent ﬁgure of the PD left, the Chair of the House Labour committee Cesare
Damiano: ‘Articolo 18, accordo possibile, ma più fondi per i sussidi’ [Art. 18, an agreement is possible, but there should
be more resources for UB], La Stampa, 6/10/2014.
9Early January 2014, Renzi wrote an open letter to leaders of the other political parties, proposing an agreement to
reform the Constitution and the electoral law in Parliament. While M5S shunned the proposal, Berlusconi agreed. This
also translated into a milder opposition to the Renzi government, until the agreement broke in early 2015 when
Sergio Mattarella was elected President of the Republic, against Berlusconi’s will.
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translated into a general strike called by CGIL and UIL in December 2014. Later on, the
JA became one of the main arguments of the opposition campaigns (in particular by
M5S and LN) against the government: the electoral campaign for the failed
Constitutional referendum (Ceccarin and Bordignon 2017), which lead to the resigna-
tion of the Renzi government in December 2016, and later the general elections
campaign in 2018 (Chiaramonte, Emanuele, Maggini, & Paparo, 2018).
Hence, if we capitalize on the famous metaphor of Kingdon, we can see that the
rising of the problem of (youth) unemployment and the windows of opportunity and
momentum – created by the external driver of implicit conditionality and the internal
driver of electoral competition – matched with the policy solution of JA as a structural
reform of the Italian labour market, thanks to the purposeful action of Matteo Renzi
acting as a policy entrepreneur since December 2013. In this process, Renzi did not act
alone – given the constant work of his advisers to draft the law and to ‘soften up’
(Kingdon, 1995) the JA as a composite policy solution. Still, it was mainly Renzi who
acted to frame the JA in the public debate as a narrative.
4. The narrative stories on the Italian jobs act
Narrative stories are presented here as reconstructed from the qualitative analysis of the
press10 (see section 2.1). For each political actor, we will highlight the main elements of
the narrative stories: a) the deﬁnition of the problem and the policy preference; b) the
character(s) of the story. We will also pay attention to the language used in the narrative
stories, and in particular to the use of symbols and metaphors. Moreover, the analysis will
shed light on the type of social policy reform narrative promoted by the diﬀerent actors
(Blum and Kuhlmann, 2019). In so doing, we will also highlight whether the content of
the narratives change upon the occurrence of windows of opportunities or momentums.
4.1 The promoters and the supporters of the JA
4.1.1 Matteo Renzi as main promoter
As said, labour policies were one of the priorities of Matteo Renzi’s political
proposals since the beginning of his term as PD’s Secretary and later as Prime
Minister, in December 2013: ‘we have to stop the bleeding of jobs’ (8/1/2014), as
Italy is a ‘Sleeping beauty’ (8/1/2014), ‘a blocked country (. . .) with a division
between those who hold rights and those who don’t’ (1/03/2014), and thus between
labour market insiders: open-ended workers, seen as the advantaged; and the out-
siders: young unemployed, non-standard workers, women, seen as the dependants
deserving a policy shift.
Renzi’s narrative identiﬁes young people and women as deserving groups in a story
of ‘giving-to-give’, that is, an expansion of rights through the new open-ended contract,
aimed at making it easier to hire new entrants into the labour market on a stabler basis,
and the extension of UB to new categories of – mostly non-standard – workers who
were formerly excluded from social protection.
10Direct quotations from each newspaper article are reported with the date in brackets.
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By contrast, Renzi identiﬁes the causes of the decline in ‘the fault of the ruling class
and of the unions’ (8/1/2014). These characters are negatively identiﬁed as villains and,
in the case of unions, as contenders because of their ‘veto power’ (5/5/2014), and
because of their defense of the insiders (interview 6): ‘where were the unions when
the biggest injustice of our times came about, that between those who hold a job and
those who don’t? (. . .) (this happened) because (the unions) have thought to ﬁght only
ideological battles and not the problems of the people’ (19/9/2014).
The emphasis on the weaknesses of the Italian labour market grows after September
of 2014, when also the ECB and its President Mario Draghi said the reform of the
labour market could not be postponed anymore (on 1/9/2014: see next section). Then
Renzi frames the JA reform within a story of decline (Stone, 2012, p. 158) where the
crisis is imposing rapid changes and also the European Union is asking for reforms. The
reform of the EPL serves two political aims: to unblock Italy, rescue it from decline, and
to claim credit at the European level, as ‘before changing the European Union, (we have
to demonstrate to) be able to change ourselves’ (22/11/2014).
Furthermore, Renzi said that ‘the actual protection system is unequal, and being left
wing means to ﬁght inequality’ (20/9/2014). In this way, Renzi blames the status quo,
and in particular Art. 18, as a driver of inequality, using symbols and metaphors to talk
to the youngest and to emphasize the need to dismiss it: ‘Art. 18 doesn’t work anymore;
it is like putting a coin into the iPhone, or like putting a ﬁlm roll into a digital camera’
(26/10/2014); ‘a constitutional right is to actually have a job, not to have Art. 18ʹ (29/9/
2014). Accordingly, the policy solution can be achieved only by ‘a Copernican revolu-
tion’ by ‘skipping the dialogue with the trade unions’, in a strategy of ‘disintermedia-
tion’ that implies ‘to talk directly with the workers’ and to appeal to the young and to
non-standard workers (4/5/2014).
The emphasis on stories of ‘giving-to-shape’ to promote ALMP is also present, as the
JA has a strong progressive component: ‘to give rights to the outsiders’, to the ‘new weak
people, who need diﬀerent answers than those of the past’; ‘the safety net has been broken
and we need to mend it knowing that there is a friendly State to help’ (29/9/2014).
To sum up, the narrative stories of Renzi mingles stories of giving-to-give to expand
employment chances and social rights and also evokes stories of giving-to-shape to
backup ALMP, a scene tainted by the unions who defend the privileges of labour
market insiders. This opposition between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’, and between the
‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’ is typical of Renzi’s political discourse (Ferrera, 2016). In
the JA reform, this rhetoric is explicitly connected with the introduction of policy
options to target new social needs, particularly in terms of labour market liberalization
aimed at reducing dualization, but also in terms of the extension of the UB and of the
introduction of more eﬀective ALMP.
Nonetheless, the analysis of Renzi’s narratives further reveals that the focus gradually
shifts towards the divisive symbol of Art. 18, and ultimately from the policy contents of
the reforms towards the identiﬁcation of the JA as a ‘leftist thing’, and as a symbol of his
personal policy style: ‘what is the identity of the left in Italy? Giving rights and
opportunities to the young (. . .) the JA is the leftists thing my government has done’
(31/3/2015); ‘time will tell who was right on the JA, if us or the unions (. . .) we had to
wait until now to see this happen, and we have not allowed the unions to block this
project’ (27/7/2015); ‘the JA is leftist’ (10/8/2016).
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4.1.2 The supporters of the reform: International actors and junior partners in the
coalition government
Renzi’s narrative seems quite in line with those proposed by the International Monetary
Fund (‘a reform of labour market is a priority, and the JA is in the right direction’ (8/
10/2014)), the ECB (‘structural reform on labour cannot be postponed’ (1/09/2014), ‘the
reform of the labour market contributed to the new dynamism in the job market’ (22/
12/2016), and the European Commission (‘youth unemployment is a priority, the
implementation of the JA is the solution’ (1/06/2014); ‘in order to ﬁght unemployment,
let the entrance in the marker be easier and allow more ﬂexibility. JA is a key reform’
(21/09/2015)).
As for the junior partners in the coalition government, the NCD Senator and Chair
of the Senate labour committee until 2018, Maurizio Sacconi, was a former labour
minister, and framed the problem of unemployment as the product of ‘the ideological
prejudices of the Left on the labour market’ (24/9/2014). Art. 18 epitomizes these
rigidities, and it is a ‘totem to break down’ (26/07/2014). His policy preference is
thus for ‘a necessary combination of ﬂexibility and security to manage the crisis’ (24/
9/2014), with a serious investment in ALMP, making explicit reference to transitional
labour markets theory (Schmid, 2006).
4.1.3 The employers’ associations and the trade union CISL as supporters
The JA reform, and in particular the intervention on EPL, was supported by the
employers’ association, despite their ado for the ‘disintermediation’ strategy of Renzi
which involved bypassing also such associations (interview 2; interview 3; interview 4).
The employers’ associations narrated a story of ‘taking-to-control’ that proposes liberal-
ization as a solution to the rigidities of the labour market. Basically, Conﬁndustria
argued that unemployment is due to high labour costs, the overcomplication of labour
legislation, in particular after Monti’s labour market reform because it ‘reduced ﬂex-
ibility and increased labour costs for the enterprises’ (04/03/2014) and because of the
‘Art. 18, a mantra (. . .) that curbs foreign investments’ (22/9/2014). Other employers’
associations in craftmanship, services and retail were openly in favor of the JA, as it was
a ‘welcome reform that ﬁnally opens the door to the young people and to those who do
not hold a job’, in the words of one craftmanship association (8/3/2015).
After initial skepticism, the attitude towards the government of centrist union
Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori (CISL) became more openly positive
with the new secretary general Anna Maria Furlan in October 2014. CISL openly
criticized the other two unions, CGIL and UIL, for the general strike called in
October 2014 against the JA during the Parliamentary discussion of the delegating
bill. CISL considered the problem of unemployment as a priority, building on a ‘giving-
to-give’ story that portrays the young as particularly deserving dependant characters:
‘there is a generation of cheated young people (. . .) who do not have a salary, or social
security, they have nothing. And they have to count on the new open-ended contract.
To this goal, CISL is even willing to restructure Art. 18ʹ (20/09/2014).
Hence, CISL’s policy preference is to establish the new open-ended contract as the
preferred option for the employers, in order to absorb ‘legalized precariousness’ (25/11/
2015), and to make the employers, seen as contenders, more responsible: ‘now with the
JA the entrepreneurs no longer have excuses, they have to hire’ (31/12/2014). Notably,
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when new-social-risks exited the debate, CISL encouraged the government to do more
for ALMP, as ‘we await the government at the gate for more ﬁnancial resources on
active policies’ (31/08/2015).
4.2 The challengers to the JA
4.2.1 The political opposition to the government: Forza Italia, Lega Nord, M5S
The challengers to the JA entered the public debate to react to the speciﬁc points of the
reform. As we will see, the few counter-narratives available are quite similar, and point
to both substantive and, most of all, identity reasons.
Political opposition to the JA by Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia (FI) oscillated during
the period considered. After an initial support for both substantive (‘these are the reforms
we wanted, we will say yes’ (28/09/2014)) and tactical reasons (‘let’s say yes to the JA in
order to break the PD (22/09/2014)), in December 2014 FI already deﬁned the JA ‘a
farce’, ‘a leftist reform that discourages hiring’ (2/12/2014). Opposition became stronger
after February 2015 with the end of the agreement between Berlusconi and Renzi to
reform the Constitution and the electoral law in a bipartisan way. Even more ambiguous
was Lega Nord (LN): when the reform of Art. 18 entered the debate, LN declared: ‘we will
cheer neither for Goofy-Renzi, nor for Pluto-Camusso (CGIL’s general secretary)’ (25/11/
2014). In Parliament LN opposed the reform as ‘it does not solve the problems of the
young people: of those who leave the country, and of those who remain (. . .): the JA
creates instability’ (25/11/2014). LN harshest opposition came later on, during the
campaigns for the referendum on the Constitutional reform in 2016, and for the 2018
political elections, when the JA is accused to be the cause of the insecurity that ‘forced our
kids to escape the country’ (17/09/2017).
Similarly, M5S moved from indiﬀerence to the blueprint to a strong critique after
Art. 18 entered the debate. M5S’ leader Beppe Grillo said that ‘Art. 18 is untouchable,
and the government should explain how removing workers’ rights is of help for the
economy’. In Grillo’s narrative, the true intention of the government is ‘to empty the
holes of the international ﬁnance with the theft of the workers’ rights, and to turn the
workers into the new slaves’ (25/09/2014), thus putting forward a conspiracy story in
Stone’s (2012, 167) terms.
Summing up, there is a reactive narrative that only partially links problems to causes
and technical solutions, through an over-simpliﬁed framing that equates the JA to
uncertainty for the youth. New social risks are absent in these narratives.
4.2.2 The internal opposition to the government: the PD minority
In the Italian party system, PD reconciles the heritage of both the former Communists
and Christian Democrats, plus former centre-left pro-market parties, and thus brings
a composite identity of diverse (and sometimes opposed) symbols. In the years of the
economic crisis, PD was the keystone to the coalition governments of Monti, Letta, and
ﬁnally Renzi, but the dialectic between the factions of the party has always been lively.
In the case of the JA reform, the minority of the party led by established old-left ﬁgures
such as Bersani, and younger representatives, such as Fassina and Civati, started to
openly challenge the JA after the introduction of Art. 18 revision in the debate in
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Summer 2014. It has to be noticed that the JA became one of the reasons why, later on,
some of these leaders left PD to create brand new leftist parties and movements.
For the PD minority, the problem was the JA itself, and in particular those policy
choices, such as the limitation of the scope of Art. 18, which were labelled as ‘right-wing’
or ‘neo-liberal’: ‘the abolition of Art. 18 is a reduction of the workers’ rights and dignity,
and this is the policy of the right’ (14/9/2014). These narratives present the Art. 18 as
a symbol of the left, being the product of the battles of the workers. In Bersani’s words: ‘in
the battle between capital and labour, I rally with labour’ (19/9/2014). In a similar vein,
Fassina declared: ‘with the JA, Renzi fosters a right-wing agenda, like Monti did’ (16/9/
2014); ‘this is the agenda of the power élite, the Troika agenda’ (29/9/2014). The
argument proceeded with a conspiracy ﬂavor, because the new rules on EPL are described
as ‘a favor to the enterprises who ﬁre (. . .) It is a regressive change, not a Copernican, but
a conservative revolution (. . .) recommended by the Troika’ (26/12/2014).
The narrative stories of PD’s internal opposition is oriented to the old social risks, to be
tackled by reinforcing existing policy instruments. In these narratives, the JA createsmore job
insecurity, and,most notably, it represents a betrayal of the party’s identity and ‘a loss ofDNA’
(1/10/2014). As a matter of fact, several MPs participated to the general strike called by CGIL
and UIL, as ‘here are the needs that a left-wing party has to listen to’ (25/10/2014).
4.2.3 The societal opposition to the Jobs Act: the trade unions CGIL and UIL
For UIL, the JA ‘impinges on already existing job safeguards’ (29/09/2014), and it will
bring about more job uncertainty: ‘the JA is the scalp for the EU’ (18/09/2014); ‘the Italian
way to growth is the freedom to ﬁre’ (5/09/2015). The focus is on EPL legislation and the
responsibility of the employers as contenders: ‘the winner is Conﬁndustria, the losers are
the workers’ (18/06/2015). The alternative solution is to revert to traditional protection:
‘employment is not increasing, STW is the needed instrument of protection’ (9/9/2016).
Similar – and even more severe – tones can be found in CGIL’s narratives. The
problem of unemployment is due to job insecurity and the JA worsens it (22/03/2014):
‘ﬁgures about dismissals (. . .) conﬁrm that (. . .) there is no need to liberalize dismissals’
(28/11/2014). Contrary to Renzi’s narrative, the reform is portrayed as story where the
undeserving employers gain and the deserving workers, the advantaged, are the sacri-
ﬁcial lambs: ‘Art. 18 is a solid safeguard, the government will not silence the voice of
workers’ (25/10/2014); ‘the JA is wrong, there are no progressive safeguards, there is
only a liberalization of lay-oﬀs’ (27/01/2015). Moreover, the government strategy of
credit claiming from the EU is framed as a conspiracy: ‘the JA was meant to have EU’s
appraisal, not to produce growth’ (10/04/2016). Instead, the only possible solution is to
abandon the JA, return to STW and to other instruments of safeguards (interview 3),
and possibly extend them through public spending (interview 4): ‘the JA is ineﬀective
because investments lag behind, and particularly public investments’ (4/05/2015).
CGIL’s narrative also condemns Renzi’s attitude towards the unions, and represent
him as a right-wing policy-maker: ‘Renzi looks at Margaret Thatcher’ (19/9/2014); ‘Renzi
is the man of the power élite’ (29/10/2014); ‘Renzi is dividing the country’ (3/11/2014),
and ﬁnally, Renzi’s impatience towards concertation ‘is twisting democracy’ (6/5/2015).
Thus, the analysis of UIL and CGIL narratives shows a common understanding of the
problem of unemployment as produced by the lack of public intervention and investments.
The JA is a favour to employers that implies cuts in social protection and rights. The
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government, and Renzi in particular, represents a coalition of conservative interests, not
labour.
5. Discussion
The analysis shows that diverse types of social policy reform narratives can coexist.
Within the camp of the reform supporters, the expansionary measures for old social
risks – such as the increase in UB – are presented as a ‘giving-to-give’ story that identiﬁes
the young people outside the labour market as the most deserving target population in
the economic crisis. Other deserving groups such as women are cited, but a coherent
‘giving-to-shape’ story that justiﬁes expansionary measures to cope with new social risks
is scanty. By the same token, interventions on EPL (which were coupled with a very
generous tax break for employers on new open-ended hires) are framed as an opportunity
of more and better jobs for outsiders, and thus again as a ‘giving-to-give’ story.
As for the challengers to the reform, their narratives defy the idea the JA contains
expansionary measures for both old and new social risks, and instead frame the
government proposals as a retrenchment especially on old social risks, whereby the
limitation of the Art. 18 does not solve the problem and rewards the employers.
Moreover, these narratives strongly attack the international ﬁnance and the EU, and
the promoters of the JA, in a sort of conspiracy story. The policy alternatives are not
framed in terms of expansionary measures to face new social risks, but only in terms of
increase in existing measures to cope with old social risks.
As for the role of Renzi acting as a policy entrepreneur in shaping the narratives to
couple the streams, the analysis has revealed that narrative stories do not radically change
at the occurring of events and developments potentially creating momentum, apart from
a decisive twist towards the revision of Art. 18 in September 2014, driven by external
factors that created a new momentum, then exploited for domestic political aims. Renzi’s
narrative was aimed at showing the JA as a Copernican revolution of the youngest against
the status quo, identiﬁed in unions defending Art. 18, thus conﬁrming the entrepreneurial
strategic use of framing and emotions. From that moment on, and particularly so after
the approval of the implementing decrees in June 2016, the policy content of the JA loses
salience in the public debate, and the content of the narratives revolves around the JA
being left-wing or right-wing, and being a symbol of Renzi’s policy style. The policy
content of the JA, and in particular its most innovative parts – the restructuring of UB
and the design of ALMP – remained in the backstage (interview 1; interview 6).
The shift in the contents of the narrative stories from the policy issues to the personal
features of the political leader corroborates the idea that the narratives of the JA reform
were unable to convey a sense of future gains as a reward for present sacriﬁces, thus
weakening the legitimacy of the reform itself. While reﬂecting on the hurdles of the
implementation of the JA, Sacchi (2018) suggested that there was an absence of a broader
ideational and discursive framework: ‘[. . .] Renzi’s reforms where [not] framed in a long-
term, future-oriented narrative able to convey the message that, alongside their immediate
payoﬀ, such reforms would be the cornerstone of a new approach based on social invest-
ments rather than on compensation of traditional categories’.
At the same time, the narrative stories of the challengers were reactive with respect to JA’s
policy solutions, and in particular to policy choices on EPL bearing strong symbolic meaning.
498 M. TULLIA GALANTI AND S. SACCHI
The clearest example is the polarization of the public debate around the issue of Art. 18. The
debate instantly became a battle of symbols and identity, while the JA was labelled either as
a ‘left-wing’ or a ‘right-wing’ reform, extending or reducing workers’ rights. The battle of
symbols is hardly ever translated into a story about how the problem of unemployment came
about, or a story about how to cope with new welfare demands or new social risks.
Therefore, the analysis of the narratives shows that the JA itself becomes a symbol of
a ‘political season’ (interview 5) and ultimately of a speciﬁc political leader, Matteo
Renzi. This personalization of the JA is put forward by Renzi himself, and by his
political opponents on both sides of the political spectrum. This is particularly evident
on the occurrence of important electoral dates (the vote for the constitutional revision
in 2016, and later the general elections in 2018).
6. Concluding remarks
Overall, the analysis of the narrative stories over the JA reform seems to suggest that political
actors tend to shape their arguments linking policy problems, causes and solutions to couple
the streams. In particular, in the case of the JA the purposeful action of a political leader acting
as policy entrepreneur shapes the narrative stories around symbols to rouse emotions, turning
the public debate on the JA away from its policy content and into a symbol of his own political
leadership. The choice of policy instruments progressively disappears from the narrative
stories, leaving the scene to a battle over symbols and identity.
In the interplay between external and domestic drivers, the same argument can be
overturned by diﬀerent politically motivated actors: while the reformers argue that the
JA is needed to modernize Italian welfare and gain international credibility, the
challengers argue that the JA is aimed at serving external masters (the European
Commission, the ECB, ﬁnancial markets) at the expense of Italian workers. Hence,
the very same driver (Italy’s duties as a member of the Economic and Monetary Union
and, more broadly, the very stability of the latter) can be narrated as good or as evil
according to context and timing.
This dynamic would help to explain the lack of a coherent narrative that links new
social risks with ‘active securities’ (Schmid, 2006) and new forms of protection. As
a matter of fact, the story about the dismissal of the Art. 18 tended to monopolize (and
polarize) the electoral debate, without leaving much space for a positive story focused
on the advantages of an expansion of protection in a wider portfolio of new social risks
or about what was lacking in the reform in terms of such expansion and the desirability
of a change of tack in this regard. Rather, the ‘new’ social risks were invariably seen
through the lenses of the ‘old’ policy solutions.
Ultimately, to have been only partly able to legitimize what can be considered
substantively innovative policy solutions, breaking away with Italy’s welfare and labour
policy legacy, and rather having shifted and polarized the debate towards the JA as an
act of political leadership, can be considered among Renzi’s largest shortcomings,
irrespective of the quick and successful adoption of the reform. To quote Renzi’s
main labour policy advisors commenting upon this issue, ‘no structural reform can
survive the contradictions in its own narrative’ (Nannicini et al., 2019).
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